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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
M. A. STRAND, dba Strand Electric 
Service Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8594 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant will agree that plaintiff's statement of facts 
accurately represents part of what plaintiff's witnesses 
testified to and part of "'Nhat plaintiff's exhibits show-with 
one exception. On pages 6 and 15 of -·the brief plaintiff's 
counsel refers to a meeting in Omaha between the plaintiff 
and Mr. Dickinson of the defendant railroad and states, 
"At that time the railroad company agreed, in substance, 
to change the method of compensation in the contract from 
a unit price to a cost basis." Plaintiff's counsel refers to 
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page 7 4 of the record. Plaintiff did not testify to that at 
all on page 7 4 of the record, or any other place. The only 
testimony as to what was agreed upon in Omaha is found 
on page 68 and it is contained in this one sentence, which 
begins with line 9: "They agreed at that meeting to tele-
graph the W a.Iker Bank and advanced some money right 
away to keep the job going." That obviously does not con-
stitute evidence of an agreement "in substance," or other-
wise, to change the method of compensation in the contract 
from a unit price basis to a cost basis. Plaintiff's evidence 
is that this alleged agreement to change the payment from 
a unit price basis to a cost basis was made between the 
plaintiff and a Mr. Prater, an engineer of the railroad, in 
Salt Lake City in September 1944. 
This is pointed out because the contract (Exhibit 1), 
Section 9, provided that any agreements concerning extra 
work were to be made with the "engineer," who was a Mr. 
Dickinson, and not with a Mr. Prater, or anyone else. 
Some significant testimony appearing in the record 
and alleged to be fact by the plaintiff, is not recited in 
plaintiff's brief. The plaintiff and his son testified to num-
erous provisions in an alleged oral agreement which were 
modifications of the written agreement. According to 'the 
plaintiff and his son there was an oral agreement entered 
into between the plaintiff and Mr. Prater in Salt Lake City 
sometime in September 1944, six years and three months 
before the complaint was filed in this case and twelve years 
before· plaintiff brought the matter to trial. By this alleged 
oral agreement several provisions in the '\Vritten contract 
were changed. It is true (but beside· the point here) that 
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there is no evidence whatsoever that this Mr. Prate-r had 
any authority whatsoever to make or change any agreement 
on behalf of the railroad. However, it is claimed by the 
plaintiff that Mr. Prater agreed : 
" ( 1) That after the job was done, the parties 
would sit down together and go over the details and 
make adjustment; then the railroad would pay the 
insurance and expenses so that the plaintiff would 
not lose a dime ( R. 59) . The written contract speci-
fied unit prices (Ex. 1, section 2). 
"(2) That it would be satisfactory to the rail-
road if the plaintiff got the job done 'as fast as 
possible' (R. 60). The written contract specified 
the completion date as July 1, 1944. (Exhibit 1 and 
R. 75.) 
"(3} That all costs and expenses from the be-
ginning to the end of the job would be paid (R. 60). 
There was no such provision in the written contract. 
" ( 4) That the railroad would pay plaintiff all 
of his losses on the job (R. 61). There was no such 
provision in the written contract. 
" ( 5) That the railroad would pay the plaintiff 
for all depreciation on equipment (R. 61, R. 75). 
There was no such provision in the written contract. 
" ( 6) That the railroad would pay the capital 
expenditures incurred by the plaintiff in connection 
with the job, including the payment for trucks, cat-
erpillars and horses purchased for the job (R. 62, 
R. 75). There was no such provision in the written 
contract. 
"(7) That it would be all right with the rail-
road if the plaintiff finished the job by Christmas,'' 
(R. 76). The contract specified July 1, 1944, as the 
completion dat~ 
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On page 79 of the record, beginning at line 21, the 
court said to plaintiff's counsel: 
"You now take the position that the oral agree-
ment was an amendment of the written agreement?" 
and plaintiff's counsel answered : 
"Yes, that the written agreement was amended 
by an oral understanding between the parties." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CON-
SISTENT WITH, AND SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
IN THIS CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
BOTH POINTS INVOLVE THE SAME ISSUE 
AND WILL BE ARGUED TOGETHER. 
According to the plaintiff's argument in his brief there 
is only one issue in this case : Was the court wrong in his 
finding of fact No. 4, that "plaintiff's action is founded 
on a contract partly in writing and partly oral?" and in 
the court's consequent conclusion of law that "Plaintiff's 
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations 
* * *" . 
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Plaintiff in his brief does not quarrel with the court's 
conclusions of law Nos. 1 and 2 that 
"(1) Actions on contracts which are partly in 
writing and partly oral are subject to the statute of 
limitations covering oral contracts." 
"(2) In the State of Utah an action on an 
oral contract must be commenced within four years 
of the time the cause of action arises." 
And there is no debate about the fact that plaintiff's cause 
of action arose on January 7, 1945, and that more than four 
years elapsed before suit was brought. 
The plaintiff admits that when an action is based on 
a written agreement which has been materially modified 
by an oral agreement so that the agreement sued on is. partly 
oral and partly written, the entire agreement becomes, in 
contemplation of the limitations laws., an oral agreement. 
However, now, in spite of what plaintiff's counsel said at the 
time of trial, he contends that his action is based on thewrit-
u 
ten contract alone and that the agreement to change the com-
pensation from a unit price to a cost basis was not a modifi-
cation of the original contract * * * ." such as to render the 
agreement upon which he sues partly oral and partly writ-
ten. Plaintiff claims that the change of amount and method 
of payment and the change of time of the completion of 
the job made by oral agreement, was not an oral agreement 
but merely an implementation of Sections 9 and 20 of the 
written contract, providing for the procedure to be followed 
in connection with "extra work", and plaintiff contends 
that evidence aliunde the written contract can be admitted 
to reveal the obligation of the· railroad under the written 
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contract without rendering the four-year statute of limita-
tions applicable. Plaintiff's counsel claims that all plain-
tiff asks for in this lawsuit was provided for in the written 
contract and that an obligation was immposed upon the 
railroad in the written contract to pay what the plaintiff 
seeks to recover in this suit. 
The defendant will concede that under some circum-
stances evidence aliunde a written contract may be intro-
duced to illuminate the details of a written contract with-
out turning the written contract into an oral contract within 
the contemplation of the limitations laws. The crucial ques-
tion then is : What evidence may be introduced and for 
what purpose? 
This requires examination of the cases and authorities 
involving the basic proposition of when a written contract 
by oral modification is converted into an oral contract in 
contemplation of the limitations laws. 
53 C. J. S., page 1030, Section 68, dealing with "Con-
tracts Partly in Writing," states as follows: 
"Actions on contracts which are partly in writ-
ing and partly oral are subject to statutes of limi-
tation covering oral contracts, as are actions on 
written agreements which are so indefinite as to 
necessitate resort to parol testimony to make them 
complete. 
"For the purpose of distinguishing between oral 
and written contracts, as those terms are used in 
the statutes of limitation, a written contract, as de-
fined supra, Section 60, is one which in all its terms 
is in writing; and a contract partly in writing and 
partly oral is in legal effect an oral contract, an 
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action on which is governed, as to the period of 
limitation, by the statute governing oral contracts 
generally * * *." 
17 C. J. S., page 870, Section 379: 
"'Vhere a written contract is modified verbally, 
the entire contract becomes an oral one." 
34 American Jurisprudence, Limitations of Actions, 
page 76, Section 92: 
"Limitation statutes customarily provide a per-
iod, frequently less than that for actions upon writ-
ten contracts, for the commencements of actions 
upon contracts, obligations, or liabilities not founded 
upon instruments in writing. As has been noted, 
such a provision is applicable if the promise arises 
only upon proof of extrinsic facts, or if the agree-
ment must be proved only by evidence aliunde, or 
if the liability sought to be enforced is imported into 
an agreement from some extrinsic source. It seems 
that it also applies if the agreement is partly oral 
and partly written." 
An annotation found in 129 A. L. R. 604 specifically 
treats the situation involved in this case. I quote from page 
604: 
"Cases collected in this annotation concern the 
effect of the necessity of introducing evidence, oral 
or written, extrinsic to a written contract, upon the 
question whether a given action is deemed to be 
upon a 'written contract' or upon a 'writing for the 
payment of money or property' within the meaning 
of a statute of limitations, or is deemed to be within 
the contemplation of any other statute of limitations 
* * * This annotation only includes cases in 
which there was in existence a written contract be-
tween the parties to the action." 
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Page 613: 
"A majority of the cases upon the point sup-
port the rule that an action upon a contract is sub-
ject to a limitations statute applicable to oral con-
tracts, rather than to one applicable to written con-
tracts, where evidence extrinsic to a written agree-
ment must be used to show the obligation itself, as 
distinguished from detail of the obligation that is 
sought to be enforced." 
The case of Lugland vs. W. T. Tomlin, 287 S. W. 2d 
188, decided in Texas in 1956, is very closely analogous to 
the facts in this case. A contractor brought action against 
a home owner to recover the amount allegedly due the con-
tractor under the contract for the construction of the home. 
The original plans and specifications were contained in a 
writt·en agreement, but they were changed to such an ex-
tent that a new plan had to be drawn but the specifications 
were not rewritten. Oral agreements for changes in the 
specifications were relied on. The court held that the con-
tract had become an oral contract and any claim arising 
under it was governed by the two-year statute of limitation 
rather than the four-year statute applicable to written con-
tracts. This case is convincingly analogous because the 
written contract contained a provision with regard to alter-
ations, changes or extra work, and it provided that any 
alterations or changes from the plans and specifications 
were to be paid for by the owner at the times that the 
materials. "vere furnished by the contractor. It was argued 
in that case just as plaintiff is arguing here, that the oral 
alterations and changes were merly implementations of the 
alteration and change provision in the written contract and 
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did not change the contract sued upon from a written con-
tract to an oral contract. The court was not impressed by 
that argument. 
The court said: 
"Here the original plans and specifications were 
changed to such an extent that a new plan had to 
be drawn but the specifications were not rewritten. 
Oral agreements for changes in the specifications. 
were relied on. Under such circumstances the con-
tract becomes an oral one and any claim arising 
under such a contract is governed by the two-year 
statute of limitations." 
On the question of the claim that the oral amendments 
were merely implementations of the written contract, the 
court said this : 
"Appellee contends that the following stipula-
tion contained in the ~Nritten contract, to wit: 'Any 
alterations or changes from plans or specifications 
to be paid for by owners at times materials furnished 
by contract,' was sufficient to show that the parties 
contemplated alterations and changes at the time 
the original contract was executed, and is sufficient 
to take this case out of the general rule. We cannot 
agree.'' 
It is impossible to find a case more closely analogous to the 
one at bar than this Texas case. 
In the case of Homire vs. Stratton & T. Company, 164 
S. W. 67, (Kentucky, 1914), the original contract sued upon 
provided that plaintiff should receive $50 a month as his 
compensation under the contract if defendant decided at 
the end of six months or sooner to discontinue the agree-
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ment; but if defendant decided after six months to continue 
the agreement, the plaintiff's. salary should be $100 a 
month, which should apply from the beginning of the 
contract. 
A subsequent oral agreement extended the six months' 
. 
trial period and thus created an issue as to how much the 
plaintiff should be paid. 
It was held that the oral modification rendered the 
entire agreement an oral agreement in contemplation of 
the limitation-of-actions law. 
The court said : 
"Periods of limitation are graduated mainly 
with reference to the nature and quality of the evi-
dence by which the contract sued upon must be 
established. The limitation in this state, for instance, 
upon contracts in writing is fifteen years, while 
upon oral contracts is but five years. In the one 
case there is a permanent memorial of the terms of 
the agreement, while in the other, the terms of the 
agreement are rendered subject to the uncertainties 
of human testimony and to the frail and perishing 
nature of parol proof. The modification of a con-
tract in writing by parol agreement of the parties 
which goes to a material part thereof, therefore, 
should operate to reduce it to the status of a contract 
by parol, in determining the applicability of statutes 
of limitation, for, when so modified, its entire pur-
port, terms, and construction are rendered subject 
to establishment by parol proof in the same measure 
as those of a contract entirely by parol. And, in 
addition, it is more reasonable that the parol part, 
being the more recent expression of the intention of 
the parties, should draw to its nature the written 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
stipulations of the written contract than that the 
written contract should draw to it the new parol 
stipulations. Therefore, when by subsequent parol 
agreement of the parties a written contract has been 
modified in its material parts, the whole contract is 
thereby reduced to the status of a parol agreement, 
in determining the applicability of statutes of limi-
tations. 
"So, whether the extension of time was a mere 
modification by parol of the terms of the original 
written contract, or whether it created a new con-
tract, discharging the original contract, the five-
year statute of limitation applies." 
In the case of L. Cannaday vs. Martin, 98 S. W. 2d 1009 
(Texas, 1936), the defendant agreed in writing to erect 
a building for plaintiff. The writing contained no details 
as to the size or nature of the building, but plaintiff alleges 
an oral agreement had established the size and nature of 
the building to be constructed. The plaintiff claimed that 
the oral agreement was supposed to have been included in 
the written memorandum but was left out by mistake.- The 
plaintiff sought reformation of the written instrument to 
include the parol provisions of the agreement. 
The defendant failed to construct the building, and 
the plaintiff sued for damages. 
The two-year statute of limitations on oral agreements 
had run prior to the commencement of this suit. 
The court cited numerous cases holding that an agree-
ment partly written and partly oral is an oral agreement 
and then said on page 1013: 
"It being admitted that the agreement sued on 
was partly written and partly oral, and undisputed 
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that more than 31/2 years elapsed from * * * 
the date of the breach on which appellees recovered 
until * * * the date on which their suit was 
first filed, limitations was complete and the cause 
of action for damages was barred before the suit 
was instituted." 
There are numerous cases standing for the general 
proposition that when a written contract is modifie~ by 
an oral agreement so that the agreement when sued upon 
is partly oral and partly written, the entire contract be-
comes an oral contract. However, inasmuch as this general 
principle of law is admitted by the plaintiff, I see no need 
to go on burdening the court with the citation of a lot of 
cases. The pertinent question here is whether or not the 
particular facts in this case are such as to enable the plain-
tiff to introduce evidence aliunde the contract without so 
altering the contract as to make it an oral agreement sub-
ject to the four-year statute of limitations. 
Let us examine cases where parol testimony has been 
admitted to illuminate or implement the obligation under 
a written contract and in which the courts have decided 
such parol did not convert the written contract into an oral 
one. All these cases follow a definite pattern, and the de-
fendant submits that none of them are applicable to the 
facts in this case. The crucial factual issue in the case at 
bar is when may parol testimony aliunde a contract be 
introduced to determine what should be paid under a writ-
ten contract? All the courts follow the unvarying principle 
that the written contract must have set up an objective 
standard for payment, which then can and must be observed 
and followed in the parol testimony. 
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Let us examine the plaintiff's own cases cited in his 
brief. 
The case of Lewis vs. Taylor, 204 S. W. 383, was de-
cided in 1918 and dealt with an oral change in price of wheat 
sold under a written contract. If this 1918 Texas case had 
any merit to support plaintiff's theory, it has been com-
ple~ly discredited and vitiated by the 1956 Texas case of 
Lugland vs. Tomlin, cited above, which case deals with the 
exact type fact situation involved in the case at bar. 
The case of Fabian, et al. vs. Lammers, 84 P. 432, is 
not in point. In that case a group of adjoining land owners 
agreed in writing to build re,spective sections of a levee to 
protect all of them against flood. Part of the written agree-
ment read "that the levee to be built by each of the parties 
hereto shall be of the same size, height, width, character 
and in accordance with the said decision of the aforesaid 
George A. Atherton, ci vii engineer * * *" . 
The defendant failed to build his levee, and the plain-
tiff, one of the parties to the contract, built it for him and 
sued him for the amount it cost him. Defendant claimed 
that the agreement was partly in writing and partly oral 
and therefore the longer statute of limitations was applic-
able. The court correctly decided that the claim was based 
on a contract in writing and held for the plaintiff. This 
case is not applicable to the case at bar because in this 
Fabia:J, case there w~s no modification of the written agree-
ment t:;' a subsequent oral agreement. The written contract 
established an objective standard to be followed in deter-
mining the specifications of the levees, to wit: a certain 
engineer would make that decision. That objective stan-
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dard was followed. The engineer did determine the speci-
fications and the levee was built in accordance therewith. 
In the case at bar if the written contract between the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company and Strand had said: 
"The amount of compensation to be paid Strand will be 
determined by Mr. Prater, an engineer," then this Fabian 
case would be in point and Prater's decision could be intro-
duced in evidence to show the railroad's obligation and it 
would not convert the written contract into an oral one, 
but the UPRR Co.-Strand contract did not say that. On 
the contrary, it provided its own specific objective standard 
by which payment was to be computed, that is, by unit 
prices specifically set forth in Section 2 of the contract. 
A subsequent oral agreement completely ignored that ob-
jective standard set up in the written agreement and sub-
stituted an entirely different basis of compensation. 
The case of W. T. Rawleigh Company vs. Graham, 103 
P. 2d 1076, is not in point. Here the written agreement 
provided that the plaintiff would furnish defendant with 
products "at current wholesale prices." The defendant 
claimed the contract was partly in writing and partly oral 
and that therefore the action was barred by the statute of 
limitations. The court properly admitted evidence aliunde 
the written contract to show what the "current wholesale 
prices" were and held the action was based upon a contract 
in writing. The words which plaintiff's counsel quotes from 
the case in his brief clearly distinguish it from the case at 
bar: 
"The written contract relied upon by the re-
spondent is complete· and furnished an objective 
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standard (emphasis mine) for the ascertainment of 
any amount due thereunder from (the principal 
debtor) to respondent." 
In the Rawleigh case the "objective standard" set forth 
in the written contract was followed. In the case at bar 
there was an objective standard set up, that is, unit prices; 
and Strand could have introduced evidence showing the 
number of poles he put in earth, in rock, the number of 
feet of wire strung, the number of H fixtures placed and 
so on, in order to prove what he was owed if he contended 
that he had not been paid the unit prices in accordance with 
the contract. In so doing he would not have converted the 
written contract into an oral one. But that is not what he 
attempted to do. He completely ignored the objective stan-
dard provided for in the agreement and he substituted a 
cost standard allegedly arrived at subsequently and orally. 
Plaintiff's case Lyon, et al. vs. Moise's Executor, 183 
S. W. 2d 493, is clearly distinguishable from the informa-
tion the plaintiff himself has given us in the brief. The 
court said: 
"If the written contract contains a definite 
promise to pay but does not name the amount (em-
phasis mine), the fact that the amount must be 
ascertained by evidence aliunde does not bring the 
contract into the category of one partly in writing 
and partly oral." 
That is true but the reverse is also true. If the contract 
does name the amount to be paid as the UPRR-Strand 
contract did, then evidence aliunde the written contract can-
not be introduced without rendering the contract oral, when 
the evidence introduced is based on a method of computa-
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tion entirely different from, and in no way conte·mplated 
or authorized by the written contract. 
If there had been no provision for amount of payment. 
whatsoever in the UP-Strand contract, then this Lyon 
case vvould be in point, but since there was a precise pay-
ment schedule set forth in section 2 of the written con-
tract, the Lyon case has no applicability. 
There are additional facts in the Lyon case which are· 
not pointed out by the plaintiff's counsel but which are 
significant. It clearly follows "the objective standard" rule 
laid down in all these types of cases on which the plaintiff 
attempts to rely. There was an objective standard to com-
pute the amount of payn1ent set forth in the written contract 
in the Lyon case. The court referred to the Rawleigh case 
cited by the plaintiff in his brief and at page 496 the court 
said: 
"But the court held (in the Rawleigh case) that 
the writing contained a promise to pay and 'furn-
ishes an objective standard for the ascertainment of 
any amount due thereunder,' and applied the limita-
tion controlling written contracts~ The same may 
be said of the writing executed by Moise-the ob-
jective standard contained therein is 'I furthermore 
agree * * * to reimburse you for usual com-
missions and any advances made by you for my ac-
count.' " 
In ascertaining the amount due under the contract, 
Lyon, the plaintiff, used the objective standard provided 
for in the written agree·ment. 
In the case of Brown vs. Irving, 269 S. W. 686, the 
same objective-standard situation exists. In exchange for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
surrender of stock by the plaintiff, the defendant agreed to 
pay the plaintiff "a sum in cash equal to the difference be-
tween $12,500 and the cost of reorganization of said com-
pany and in sale of $90,000 par value of the preferred stock 
of the company." The reorganization of the company was 
effected, the preferred stock sold, and the plaintiff sued 
for the difference between the $12,500 and the cost of the 
reorganization and introduced extrinsic evidence to prove 
the amount of the difference. Here the plaintiff followed 
religiously the objective standard for computing the amount 
due contained in the written agreement. There was no 
subsequent oral agreement modifying the method of com-
puting the amount of payment due. Consequently, this 
case has no application to the one at bar. 
Streeper, et al. vs. Vic-tor Sewing Machine Company, 
112 U. S. 676, is exactly the same situation as the other 
cases cited by the plaintiff. The written contract itself 
set forth the method used in computing what the sewing 
machine consignee was supposed to pay plaintiff sewing 
machine. company, and that method was followed by the 
company when it sued to recover what the consignee owed 
it. The language of the court sets this forth clearly on page 
686: 
"The objection made is that although the agree-
ment states the shares to which the plaintiff and 
the consignees are to be respectively entitled, it fixes 
no price on the machines. The, answer to this, is 
that the agreement states that the retail prices for 
which the machines consigned are sold, as reported 
by the consignees, are the prices on which the com-
missions of the consignees are to be calculated ; and 
that the agreement fixes the prices of parts of the 
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machines at 40 per cent discount from list prices, 
and the prices of attachments at the lowest whole-
sale rates. By the agreement when the fixed com-
missions are deducted from the retail prices of 
sales, the rest belongs to the plaintiff; and Exhibit 
A shows the retail price of each machine sold as 
reported by the consignees and how much they re-
tained beyond what they were entitled to retain as 
commissions, and Exhibit B shows the price of each 
attachment sold to the consignees." 
This case therefore, like the others, is not in point. 
If the U.P.-Strand written contract had said that the 
railroad would pay all Strand's costs in connection with 
doing the job, then, of course, under the line of cases sub-
mitted by the plaintiff, Strand could introduce his evidence 
to show what the job cost him, and it would not convert the 
written contract into an oral contract; but, of course, that 
is not what the written contract said. 
Plaintiff's case Crook Company vs. U. S., 270 U. S. 4, 
has nothing to do with this case at all. Of course, change 
articles in contracts are legal and enforceable. Of course, 
written contracts can be changed by oral amendments and 
be binding, but the Crook case involved no problem of the 
intervention of the statute of limitations and thus no prob-
lem of whether or not the written contract had been con-
verted into an oral contract. 
The Utah case of Hardinge vs. EIMCO Corporation, 
266 P. 2d 294, also has absolutely no bearing on this case. 
The Hardinge case is simply one in which the shipper agreed 
in writing to pay the freight charges; and when the ship-
ment arrived without the freight charges having been paid, 
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the consignee paid them and then proceeded to recover the 
freight charges from the shipper, pursuant to the express 
provision of the written contract. There is in the Hardinge 
case no subsequent oral agreement whatsoever changing the 
provisions of the written contract. 
Consequently none of plaintiff's cases support the 
theory upon which he attempts to recover in this case. 
Moreover, even if plaintiff's theory were legally ten-
able, his facts do not support his theory. Counsel in his 
brief argues that all the plaintiff is attempting to do is 
to recover extra money for extra work and that the Sep-
tember oral agreement was simply a computation of the 
extra work he had done and the amount over and above the 
contract price lie was to get for that extra work. That this 
is what the plaintiff was attempting to do is not supported 
by the testimony in the record at all. The testimony shows 
that if the plaintiff was trying to get extra money for extra 
work, that was only a small part of what he was trying to 
do. In Mr. Strand's letter to Mr. Dickinson of September 
1, 1944, (plaintiff's Exhibit 3), in which Mr. Strand is 
asking for help, he names seven items that have caused him 
difficulty, and only two of them have anything to do with 
extra work. He does not ask for payment for extra work 
under Section 9 of the contract. He says: "Thus we find 
our reserves for this job used up and beg you to help us 
get some financial adjustment so we can finish the con-
tract." He asks for help because (1) the railroad delayed 
shipment of equipment, (2) the union raised its pay scale, 
(3) his camp cost him more to set up than he had antici-
pated, (4) a wind storm damaged his camp; and then he 
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refers to the two items which might be argued were extra 
work: (1) installing extra cross arms, (2) having to build 
the line farther away from the track than he anticipated. 
This, obviously, is not simply a case in which the plaintiff 
seeks extra money for extra work. He seeks to have the 
railroad pay him for the entire cost of the job plus "over-
head" and a profit without any attempt to segregate what 
was extra work or wh'at he was entitled to for that extra 
work. 
According to the plaintiff Mr. Prater did not merely 
orally agree to pay him for extra work but agreed to com-
pensate him for additional cost due to a change in a union 
agreement, a wind storm, unanticipated expense due to 
railroad's delay in delivering equipment, expense of deprec-
iation of equipment, cost of capital expenditures such as 
for trucks, caterpillars and horses, and any and all other 
expenses and losses which he incurred. Just what does the 
extra-work provision in Section 9 of the written contract 
have to do wi.th those items?! It has nothing to do with 
them, and plaintiff cannot claim that an oral agreement 
to pay all those items is based in any way on Section 9 of 
the written contract. 
Even if plaintiff's extra-work theory were legally ten-
able, and even if his theory were supported by the testi-
mony and exhibits of his witnesses, still he could not recover 
here because he did not attempt to acquire payment for 
extra work in the manner prescribed in the extra-work pro-
visions of the contract. His testimony, if true, is that even 
Section 9, the extra-work provision of the contract-the 
very section upon which he now relies-was changed by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
oral agreement. The plaintiff failed to comply with four 
conditions precedent to collecting for extra work, which 
are set forth in Section 9. Section 9 provides that if the 
extra work is not "similar" to that contracted for, (1) the 
contractor shall submit information concerning the nature 
of the same to the engineer before such work is commenced, 
(2) it shall be classified as extra work and paid for at prices 
to be agreed upon between the engineer and the contractor 
prior to the commencement of the same, and (3) in case 
the contractor does not present a claim in writing to the en-
gineer on account of dissimilarity in the work by reason of 
such change within ten days after such change has been 
explained, the contractor shall be forever estopped from 
making any clain1 therefor. 
The four requirements ignored by the plaintiff are ( 1) 
The plaintiff did not submit information before commenc-
ing the alleged extra work. (2) The plaintiff did not agree 
with anyone as to prices for the extra work prior to the 
commencement of the same. ( 3) The plaintiff did not pre-
sent a claim in writing within ten days after the change 
was explained to him, or discovered by him. (4) When he 
did achieve agreement (if that's what he did), as to prices 
to be paid for the extra work, the agreement was not made 
with the "engineer", who was Mr. Dickinson, as provided 
in the contract, but the agreement was made with a Mr. 
Prater who was endowed with no authority whatsoever by 
the written contract. 
Now, if plaintiff claims to be entitled to recover for 
extra work, he has to take the position that the provisions 
of Section 9 itself were modified by a subsequent oral agree-
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ment. He has to take the position that the railroad, by 
subsequent oral agreement, waived the above four vital 
provisions of Section 9 of the written contract. In fact, 
plaintiff's counsel, in his brief, contends that the defendant 
did waive those provisions of Section 9 (page 16 of the 
brief). If there were any such waiver, that waiver consti-
tuted an oral modification which changed material provi-· 
sions of the written contract and therefore renders the 
entire contract oral in contemplation of the limitations laws. 
If the plaintiff were actually just seeking extra pay 
for extra work, and if Section 9 of the written agreement 
had said "the contractor may do any extra work he desires 
to do whenever he desires to do it without any prior con-
sultation with anyone as to its nature or price to be charged 
for it, and after the work is done he may make a claim for 
it whenever he gets ready and a railroad engineer by the 
name of Prater may decide what the contractor is to be 
paid for it," then the plaintiff would be entitled to submit 
the extrinsic evidence of the alleged oral agreement between 
himself and Mr. Prater and it would not convert the written 
contract into an oral contract. But, of course, that is not 
what the contract said. The provisions in Section 9 were 
not just put in the contract to take up space. They were 
vital, important provisions that the railroad expected to be 
observed. The procedure outlined there was for the very 
purpose of attempting to forestall contractors' claims for 
extra work that frequently arise after a job is done with-
out the contractors ever having first consulted anyone about 
the nature or the cost of the extra work. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the written contract the railroad did not agree to 
pay for (1) capital expenditures, (2) depreciation on ma-
chinery, (3) higher wages caused by union contract in-
creases, (4) increased cost of setting up the camp, (5) loss 
resulting from a wind storm, ( 6) the total cost of the entire 
job, or (7) for extra work unless it wa~ done in accordance 
with the procedure set forth in Section 9 of the agreement. 
Yet plaintiff claims that in the subsequent oral agree-
ment Mr. Prater agreed to pay him for all of those things. 
Still the plaintiff speciously contends there was no material 
alteration of the written contract by the oral agreement. 
It is very obvious that the alleged oral agreement made 
substantial and material changes in the written contract-
so substantial that, according to the plaintiff, it would in-
crease the defendant's obligation by $94,000 over and above 
the payments which defendant's ple'adings alleged were 
made to the plaintiff by the defendant, that is, $85,929.80, 
(including $5,867.80 in extras agreed upon under the pro-
visions of Section 9) , in accordance with the unit price 
arrangements, plus an additional gratuity of $35,927.40 to 
get the job finished. 
The simple fact is that the plaintiff is asking for 
$94,000, plus 12 years' interest, based upon an oral promise 
he claims was made in 1944, and plaintiff did not even plead 
that any oral promise had been made, or pretend to rely 
on any oral promise, until eleven years after his alleged 
cause of action arose! The file shows that no oral agree-
ment was alleged by the plaintiff until the filing of his 
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amendment to his amended complaint, which was filed 
after this trial began! This. he did after defendant's wit-
nesses may be scattered or dead and many of its files on 
the matter disposed of. 
I cannot conceive a more appropriate case in which 
to apply the doctrine and principle of the bar provided by 
the statute of limitations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARVIN J. BERT·OCH, 
of Counsel. 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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